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ABSTRACT
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 has awakened the regulators 
and corporates on the importance of corporate governance. In any 
country’s economy, banking sector plays an important role for the 
better economy. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to examine 
the relationship between corporate governance and disclosure 
quality of listed banks on Bursa Malaysia. Corporate governance 
variables tested in this study are the board leadership structure, board 
composition, board size, director ownership, institutional ownership 
and block ownership. The researchers developed the disclosure index 
and it will be checked against the information disclosed in the annual 
reports. Then, in calculating the weighted disclosure score, the views 
of accountants and financial analysts are also considered through 
survey questionnaire. The results reveal that better disclosure quality 
of the annual reports in banking sector can be achieved by having 
separate board leadership structure, higher proportion of independent 
non-executive directors, higher board size, lower ownership by the 
directors, institutional  and block shareholders.
Keywords: Disclosure quality, board of directors, banks
INTRODUCTION
In Asian countries, including Malaysia, corporate governance issue becomes an 
attractive issue for researchers in late 1990s following the 1997-1998 crises (Cheung 
and Chan, 2004). According to agency theory, a good corporate governance system 
is necessary for more transparent information disclosure about the corporation, 
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particularly in the annual reports which are the main sources of information 
provided to investors. Moreover, corporate governance of the banks plays an 
important role to ensure that financial sector is stable for the better economy of 
the country (Basel Committee, 2005; Alexander, 2006; Garcia-Marco and Robles-
Fernandez, 2008). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the impacts of corporate 
governance variables in the banking sector. It also has been stated by Patel et al. 
(2002), Utama (2003) and Basel Committee (2005) that disclosure is integral to 
corporate governance because higher disclosure is able to reduce the information 
asymmetry and to make top management answerable for their tasks. 
To the researchers’ knowledge, there is no study has been done on the impact of 
corporate governance on disclosure quality in the annual reports of banking sector 
in Malaysia.  Hence, the aim of this study is to examine the important role of board 
of directors regarding disclosing quality of the annual reports.  The main research 
question is whether corporate governance mechanisms can affect the disclosure 
quality of annual reports of listed banks in Malaysia.
This paper is organized into few sections. The following section explains 
theoretical framework and prior empirical studies. Then, a brief discussion on the 
accounting standards in Malaysian banking sector is presented. The next section 
elaborates on the hypotheses development and research design. Then, the results 
are discussed and the paper later concludes. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that due to the separation of ownership and 
control, agency problems may occur. Thus, Williams et al. (2006) and Judge et 
al. (2003) suggest to implement a good corporate governance system to minimize 
the agency cost because it promotes goal congruence among principals and agents 
(Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000).  Short et al. (1999) and Cheung and Chan 
(2004) also mention that the main aim of corporate governance is to monitor the 
management to ensure that the management decision fulfills shareholders’ interests. 
The following discussions explain the corporate governance mechanisms 
from the agency theory perspective and the empirical findings related to this study. 
Agency Theory and Separate Leadership Structure
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory argues for a clear 
separation of the responsibilities of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
chairman of the board. If the CEO and the chairman of the board are not different 
persons, the same person will monitor his own performance and consequently it will 
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decrease the effectiveness of board (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2004). Thus, CEO and board chairperson should not be the same person in 
order to create pressure on the top management led by CEO to have better disclosure 
quality of the annual report. Hence, it can be asserted that better disclosure quality 
can be achieved by having separate board leadership structure.
There is a positive relationship between separate leadership structure and 
information disclosure found in studies by Ho and Wong (2001), Gul and Leung 
(2004), Lakhal (2005), Byard et al. (2006) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) which 
are in line with the theoretical expectation. On the other hand, a study by Norita and 
Shamsul Nahar (2004) reveal that separate leadership structure is not associated 
with voluntary disclosure.
Agency Theory and Board Composition
According to Choe and Lee (2003), board composition is an important corporate 
governance mechanism.  Although the executive directors have better knowledge 
about the firms, the role of the independent directors is essential to have independent 
decisions which are in line with the interest of shareholders (Weir, 1997; Firth et 
al. 2002; Cho and Kim, 2003).  Furthermore, it is believed that more independent 
directors will result better disclosure quality. The findings of Chen and Jaggi (2000), 
Gul and Leung (2004), Byard et al. (2006), Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Norita 
and Shamsul Nahar (2004) are consistent with the theoretical expectation.
Agency Theory and Board Size
Jensen (1993) and Florackis and Ozkan (2004) mention that boards with more than 
seven or eight members are unlikely to be effective. The smaller the board size, 
the better communication and coordination is (Huther, 1997; Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2003) and it will result in better disclosure quality. This expectation is supported 
in a study by Byard et al. (2006). In contrary, the finding of Lakhal (2005) does 
not support the theoretical expectation.
Agency Theory and Ownership 
Based on agency theory, this study examines the impacts of ownership structure 
variables on disclosure quality by using three proxies. They are director ownership, 
block ownership and institutional ownership.  
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Director Ownership
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that when directors are monitoring the firms where 
they have ownership interest, they may not require more disclosure in an attempt to 
create pressure on the management. It might be due to two reasons; first, they know 
the inside information about the firms and thus do not need information from the 
companies’ annual reports. Second, the directors might be interested to maximize 
their own interests at the expense of outside shareholders and in this situation, they 
may prefer to conceal some of the material information. The theoretical expectation 
seems to be supported by Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003) and Leung 
and Horwitz (2004). While Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004) and Ballesta and 
Garcia-Meca (2005) find that higher director ownership provides higher quality 
of financial reporting, studies by Chau and Gray (2002) and Huafang and Jianguo 
(2007) reveal no relationship between the variables.
Block Ownership
According to Kang and Sorensen (1999), Maher and Anderson (1999) and Kim 
and Lee (2003), block owner is defined as an individual who owns shares which 
is five percent and above of the total issued shares. By using their voting power, 
the block owners might select their trusted persons to be appointed as a CEO or 
board members. For the block shareholders, additional information disclosure 
might not be necessary because they can assess the inside information through 
their proxies, i.e. their selected CEO and board members.  They might even want 
to conceal some of the information to protect their interest. Therefore, a negative 
relationship between block holders and disclosure is expected. This is supported 
by Lakhal (2005). However, the findings of Chau and Gray (2002), Luo et al. 
(2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004) are 
not consistent with the theoretical expectation. 
Institutional Investors
Kim and Nofsinger (2004), Leng (2004), Solomon and Solomon (2004), Seifert et al. 
(2005), Le et al. (2006), Chen Li and Lin (2007) and Ramzi (2008) collectively agree 
on the important role of institutional shareholders in monitoring firm’s business 
operation.  The disclosure quality of the annual report may also increase due to their 
high ownership and a fiduciary responsibility towards the ultimate owners. Thus, 
the positive relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure quality is 
expected. The findings of Eng and Mak (2003) and Lakhal (2005) are in parallel 
with the theoretical expectation. 
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ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN MALAYSIAN 
BANKING INDUSTRY
In 2013, Bank Negara Malaysia has provided “Financial Reporting Standard”. 
It mainly consists of four parts. First, the guideline provides an overview which 
consists of the applicability, legal provision, level of application and interpretation. 
Second, it presents the regulatory requirement for the banks such as compliance with 
Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS), specific requirements on the 
application of the MFRS, the use of fair value option for financial instruments and 
the minimum disclosure requirement. Third, the standard covers on the regulatory 
process and submission requirements, for instance declaration and payment of 
dividends, annual financial statements and interim financial reports.  The last part 
of the standard presents the annual financial statements and the interim financial 
reports. This standard requires the banks to comply with the key principles 
on disclosure of information, for instance, timely and up-to-date information 
disclosure in order to avoid undue delays in disclosure. The standard recommends 
for timely information disclosure because if there is any delay in disclosing the 
information, it might impair the relevancy of the information.  In addition, there 
should be adequate information disclosure on uncertain events or situations to 
reduce risk to the investors. The disclosure should emphasize on key accounting 
estimates, assumptions and the probabilities of the occurrence of various scenarios. 
Comparative accounting information should be disclosed whereever necessary to 
provide more comprehensive information to be useful for all the involved parties.
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Development of Hypotheses
According to Patel et al. (2002), United Nation (2003) and Leong (2005), disclosure 
quality of annual reports is the heart of corporate governance because it shows the 
extent of how good corporate governance is. In addition, Beekes and Brown (2006) 
find that better-governed firms do make more informative disclosure. Hence, it is 
interesting to examine whether corporate governance variables could affect the 
disclosure quality of annual reports and the following alternative hypotheses are 
developed.
Ha1: Disclosure quality is positively related to separate leadership 
structure.
Ha2: Disclosure quality is positively related to proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the board.
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Ha3: Disclosure quality is negatively related to board size.
Ha4: Disclosure quality is negatively related to director ownership.  
Ha5: Disclosure quality is negatively related to block ownership.  
Ha6: Disclosure quality is positively related to institutional ownership.
Research Design
Dependent Variable
Weighted disclosure score is used as a dependent variable and it is measured by the 
disclosure index (Refer to Appendix 1) developed by the researchers based on the 
rules and regulations governing the banks such as Bank Negara, Basel Committee, 
Statement on Internal Control issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors Malaysia 
for public listed companies. Additionally, prior studies by Goldberg et al. (1995), 
Hafiz-Majdi (2000), Christopher and Salleh (2005) and Wong (2005) are also 
being reviewed to develop the disclosure index. In order to compute the weighted 
disclosure score, the following steps have been taken. First, the disclosure check list 
is created with two hundred and twelve items which are mixed of both voluntary and 
mandatory items of disclosure in the annual reports. Next, this disclosure checklist 
is used as a benchmark to examine whether the items from the list are disclosed in 
the annual reports of banks. Dichotomous variables, i.e. (1= disclosure item and 
0= non-disclosure item) are used. This gives the disclosure score for each item 
from the checklist. Then, survey questionnaire (Refer to Appendix 2) is developed 
to obtain views from financial analysts and accountants on the importance of 
each disclosure items. The level of importance ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 refers 
to the least important and 5 refers to the most important. For each item from the 
questionnaire, the mean of the respondents’ answer is taken to compute the average 
important level. Then it is multiplied with the disclosure score of each item which 
has been checked during the second stage of data collection in order to compute 
the weighted disclosure score, i.e. the dependent variable. 
Empirical Model
There are six independent variables which comprise of three structural measures 
of corporate governance (i.e. board leadership structure, board composition and 
board size) and three measures of ownership structure (i.e. director ownership, 
institutional ownership, and block ownership). The empirical model of the study 
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also includes two control variables related to firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm 
size and leverage).  The complete empirical model is as follow. 
Yit = βo + β1 x1it+β2 x2it − β3 x3it − β4 x4it+β5 x5it − β6 x6it + β7 x7it + β8 x8it + µit 
Where, 
i = represent the number of banks
t = represent the number of sample years
Y = Weighted information disclosure score
x1 = Board leadership structure (BLS)
x2 = Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board (INE_BZ)
x3 = Board size (BZ)
x4 = Proportion of director ownership (DOWN)
x5 = Proportion of institutional ownership (IOWN)
x6 = Proportion of block ownership (BOWN)
x7 = Log of total assets (LNTA)
x8 = Leverage (TD_TE)
µ = Error term
The respective measures for each variable are as follows:
(a) Board leadership structure is measured as follows:
Company with combined leadership structure = 0
Company with separate leadership structure = 1
(b) Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board is calculated 
as follows:
Proportion of independent 
non-executive directors =
Number of independent  
non-executive directors
Total number of directors 
on the board
(c) Board size is calculated as follows:
Board size = Total number of directors on the board
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(d) Proportion of director ownership is calculated as follows:
Proportion of director 
ownership =
Number of shares owned by  
the directors
Total number of shares issued
(e) Proportion of institutional ownership
Proportion of 
institutional ownership =
Sum of the number of shares owned 
by the institutional shareholders
Total number of shares issued
(f) Proportion of block ownership is calculated as follows:
Proportion of block 
ownership =
Sum of the number of shares of the 
owners who own 5% and above
Total number of shares issued
Sample Selection and Statistical Methods
There are only twelve listed banks in Malaysia. Thus, all banks are included 
as sample of the study. Sample data have been collected from 1996 until 2005 
incorporating data from period of five years before and after the introduction 
of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in year 2001. The total 
number of observations is 120 observations. However, a number of the observations 
have been removed due to unavailability of data and a few companies were not 
classified as banks in all the ten years’ period. It left the final observations to 108 
observations. Panel data analysis (generalized least square method) is used in this 
study because the sample data are not normally distributed and the data have either 
heteroskedasticity problem, autocorrelation problem or both. According to Gujarati 
(2003), using generalized least square method will overcome all these problems. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Pilot Test
Pilot test has been conducted. A total of fifty nine questionnaires, i.e. twenty four 
questionnaires to accountants and thirty five questionnaires to financial analysts are 
sent. Out of fifty nine, nine accountants and twelve financial analysts responded. 
Hence, the response rate is thirty six percent.  The purpose of the pilot test is to 
find out whether the questionnaire that has been developed to examine the opinion 
of financial analysts and accountants is clear, good and comprehensive enough 
to use as the actual questionnaire.  Data analysis of pilot test shows that the 
Cronbach’s alpha value is 0.94 and so it can be concluded that the questionnaire is 
internally consistent. In addition, the overall mean score for comprehensiveness 
of the questionnaire is 4.05, for understandability of the questions are 4.10 and for 
understandability of the instruction is 4.62 (Refer to Table 1).  Therefore, it can be 
asserted that the piloted questionnaire is good to be used as an actual questionnaire.
Table 1 Mean score for comprehensiveness and understandability of 
the questions and the instruction: Pilot test
No. Description
Mean
Accountants Financial analysts Overall
1 The questionnaire comprehensively 
covers the important disclosure 
items of the annual reports.
4.22 3.92 4.05
2 The contents of the questionnaire 
are easy and simple for the 
respondents to understand.
4.22 4.00 4.10
3 The instructions to answer the 
questionnaire are clear.
4.78 4.50 4.62
Table 2 shows Cronbach’s alpha value of each section from the pilot test.  The 
minimum alpha value is 0.71 and thus, it can be assumed that the respondents’ 
answer from the pilot test is reliable and consistent
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Table 2 Reliability test results: Pilot test
Alpha
Accountants Financial analysts Overall
Disclosure on strategic information 0.95 0.90 0.94
Disclosure on risk management 0.97 0.96 0.97
Disclosure on financial information 0.87 0.95 0.90
Disclosure in the notes to the accounts 0.97 0.99 0.98
Disclosure on segmental information 0.88 0.82 0.85
Disclosure on market share, contingent 
liabilities and assets, and other information 
0.95 0.93 0.95
Disclosure on social, environmental and 
value added information
0.98 0.75 0.95
Additional disclosure on operations of 
islamic banking
0.71 0.97 0.93
The Results
For the actual questionnaire, the opinions of one hundred and thirty one accountants 
and fifty one financial analysts are taken. The profile of the respondents can be 
referred to Table 3.
Table 3 describes the background information about the respondents. Overall, 
both male and female respondents seem to be equally distributed when forty nine 
percent of the respondents are male and fifty one percent of them are female. 
Regarding the educational background, the majority of the respondents are bachelor 
degree holders, and the rest are professional certificate holders.  Since fifty seven 
percent of the respondents are from the audit firms and forty three percent are 
from the non-audit firms, the opinion seems not to be too much influenced by one 
particular group because majority of the respondents are accountants.  The age 
range of the majority is between twenty to twenty nine, followed by the age range 
between thirty to thirty nine years old. In terms of working experience, majority 
of the respondents, i.e. forty three percent, are below three years working in the 
current profession and twenty three percent of them have working experience 
between three to seven years.
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The reliability test for the actual respondents is also carried out.  The results 
show that the minimum Alpha value is 0.87 from the overall results. Accordingly, 
it could be concluded that the respondents’ answers are reliable (Refer to Table 
4). Finally, non-response biasness is checked. There is no non-response bias from 
the questionnaire received from the accountants and financial analysts based on 
t-tests and Mann-Whitney U test between early respondents and late respondents.
Table 4 Reliability test results: Actual respondents
Alpha
Accountants Financial analysts Overall
Disclosure on strategic information 0.92 0.86 0.90
Disclosure on risk management 0.96 0.97 0.96
Disclosure on financial information 0.92 0.93 0.93
Disclosure in the notes to the accounts 0.95 0.96 0.96
Disclosure on segmental information 0.92 0.91 0.92
Disclosure on market share, contingent 
liabilities and assets, and other 
information 
0.88 0.85 0.87
Disclosure on social, environmental and 
value added information
0.88 0.90 0.89
Additional disclosure on operations of 
islamic banking
0.92 0.93 0.93
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. 
Concerning the board leadership structure, its mean value (0.81) shows that a 
majority of the banks have separate leadership structure although the minimum 
value (zero) shows that there are banks which have combined leadership structure. 
Similar to the recommendation of the MCCG (2001), the sample mean value (0.36) 
shows that ratio of independent directors is slightly more than one third of the total 
number of the directors. The mean value (8.23) of board size shows existence of a 
quite reasonable board size. For ownership, the mean values of director ownership 
and institutional ownership are 0.02 and 0.17 respectively. The ownership of 
shares by directors can be considered very low where, on average, only 2 percent 
of shares owned by the directors. On the other hand, institutional investors, on 
average, owned 17 percent of shares which could still be considered low although 
it is significantly higher than the ownership by the directors.  In the case of block 
ownership, its mean value (0.53) shows that the significant portion of the shares is 
owned by large shareholders.  The mean value of weighted information disclosure 
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score is 321.91.  As for the firm-specific characteristics, the sample companies have 
the means values of RM45992.19 millions for total assets and 344.73 for the ratio 
of total debt to total equity.
Table 6 and 7 show the results on the impact of corporate governance variables 
on disclosure quality. INE_BZ, BZ and BOWN have a significant impact on 
disclosure at one percent significant level.  However, only the result of INE_BZ and 
BOWN are in line with the hypothesis. Thus, it is supported that higher INE_BZ 
and lower block ownership have better disclosure, but not for BZ.  BLS is in line 
with the hypothesis while DOWN and IOWN are not although the findings are not 
significant.  Therefore, it could be generally concluded that higher disclosure could 
be achieved by separate BLS, higher INE_BZ, higher BZ, higher DOWN, lower 
IOWN and lower BOWN. The findings support the concerns raised by the MCCG 
(2001) on monitoring roles of the independent non-executive directors.  It also 
follows the concerns by other regulation such as the Combined Code in UK and 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act in US.  With more inclusion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board, it could perform its monitoring functions more effectively, 
and thus enhance disclosure quality.
Table 6 GLS results of weighted disclosure score
Coefficient Z_value P value
Independent variables
BLS 18.06 0.69 0.49
INE_BZ 262.54 9.47* 0.00
BZ 16.38 7.04* 0.00
DOWN 195.37 0.91 0.37
IOWN -5.65 -0.24 0.81
BOWN -75.16 -3.01* 0.00
Control variables
LNTA 110.50 11.08* 0.00
TD_TE -0.16 -8.11* 0.00
CONS -913.54 -10.09* 0.00
Chi-Sq. 1967.27*
P value 0.00
Heteroskedastic LR Chi2 37.71*
(LR Test) P value 0.00
Autocorrelation F statistics 84.11*
(Wooldridge Test) P value 0.00
* Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5%
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Meanwhile, both control variables, i.e. LNTA and TD_TE have significant 
impact on disclosure but the finding from leverage, i.e. TD_TE, is not according to 
what is expected in theory.  It might be due to the fact that in Malaysia, the creditors 
or the lenders do not have much power to create pressure on the management 
regarding information disclosure.
Table 7 Summary of findings
Independent variables Disclosure quality
BLS  
In line with hypothesis √
Significant level  
INE_BZ  
In line with hypothesis √
Significant level 1%
BZ  
In line with hypothesis X
Significant level 1%
DOWN  
In line with hypothesis X
Significant level  
IOWN  
In line with hypothesis X
Significant level  
BOWN  
In line with hypothesis √
Significant level 1%
CONCLUSIONS
In sum, this study conducts a content analysis from the annual reports of 
Malaysian public listed banks from 1996 to 2005.  Panel data analysis finds that 
the effectiveness of the board in influencing better disclosure quality of the annual 
reports is largely due to separate board leadership structure, the higher proportion 
of independent non-executive directors, higher board size, lower ownership by 
the directors, institutional  and block shareholders, block-holders. However, other 
conventional measures of corporate governance are not significant. 
Although the sample of the study includes twelve listed banks in Malaysia only, 
it is believed that the findings will contribute significantly to the current literature, 
academicians, investors and regulators. The study uses the weighted disclosure 
score to measure the disclosure quality of the annual reports.  The weight for each 
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disclosure item is obtained from the opinions of accountants and financial analysts. 
This study does not only use score one or zero for disclosure and non-disclosure 
items, but it  also incorporates the opinion of the users and preparers of the annual 
reports in measuring disclosure quality. Therefore, it is expected that the weighted 
score used in this study is more meaningful, compared to scoring of one or zero.  
In addition, panel data analysis is used to obtain more optimal results because 
it takes into account time series of cross-section observations. Ordinary multiple 
regression technique cannot give optimal results for changes in the dependent 
variables over time.  Results from panel data analysis give more informative data, 
more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and 
more efficiency.  Thus, it is expected that the findings are reliable because the study 
uses the statistical technique which can provide the optimal results.  
In the context of disclosure, the disclosure quality of the annual reports is 
examined comprehensively because the total number of the disclosure items in 
the index is two hundreds and twelve. Additionally, the study covers a period of 
ten years (1996-2005), i.e. five years before and after the implementation of the 
MCCG (2001). 
Hence, it is believed that the findings contribute to the academicians to 
further extend the research, the investors to make the investment decisions, and 
the regulators and policy makers to draft further rules and regulations.  Future 
research within this context is proposed to include unlisted banks because it may 
represent a broader disclosure quality in the annual reports.  In addition, it is also 
recommended that future research will incorporate interviews with the board of 
directors to find out how decision has been made to disclose information in the 
annual reports, particularly voluntary information disclosure.
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APPENDIX 1
Disclosure index
A. STRATEGIC INFORMATION
I. General background
1. Brief history of company
2. Organizational or corporate structure
3. Identification of principal products or services
4. Description of specific characteristics of these products 
or services
5. Identification of principal markets
6. Description of specific characteristics of these markets
7. Identification of senior managers
8. Description of senior management functions
II. Corporate strategy
9. A statement of corporate strategy and objective – General
10.  – Financial (Quantitative)
11.  – Financial (Qualitative)
12.  – Social
13.  – Environmental
14. Impact of strategy on current  and future results 
(Quantitative/ Qualitative)
15. Discussion of industry trends (e.g. competition)
16. Discussion of macroeconomic trends (e.g. inflation)
17. Discussion of impact of industry trends on current 
results (Quantitative/ Qualitative)
18. Discussion of impact of macro economic trends on 
current results  (Quantitative/ Qualitative)
III. Corporate governance information
19. General description of a firm’s system of internal 
control
20. Description of key procedures of the internal control 
system
21. Classification of executive directors, non-executive 
directors, and independent non-executive directors
22. Classification of chairman and CEO
23. List of the members _ Audit committee
24. List of the members _ Remuneration committee (if any)
25. List of the members _ Nomination committee (if any)
265
Impact of Corporate Governance on Disclosure Quality
26. List of the members _ Risk management committee (if 
any)
27. Composition of the members_ Audit committee
28. Composition of the members _ Remuneration 
committee (if any)
29. Composition of the members_ Nomination committee 
(if any)
30. Composition of the members _ Risk management 
committee (if any)
31. Description of the roles and responsibility _ Audit 
committee
32. Description of the roles and responsibility _ 
Remuneration committee (if any)
33. Description of the roles and responsibility Nomination 
committee (if any)
34. Description of the roles and responsibility _ Risk 
management committee (if any)
35. Remuneration (fees and other emoluments) – CEO
36.  – Executive directors
37.  – Non-executive directors
38.  – Independent non-
executive directors
39. Qualitative explanations of directors’ remuneration 
schemes
40. Age of directors
41. Educational qualifications ( Academic and professional)
42. Description of commercial experience of directors
43. Description of other directorship held by directors
44. Dates of the board meetings 
45. Frequency of board meetings 
46. Attendance of directors at board meetings
47. Audit committee meeting frequency
48. Attendance of audit committee meetings
49. Dates of audit committee meetings
50. Information on Shari’ah committee – List of the members
51.  – Description of the roles 
and responsibility
52.  – Educational 
qualification (Academic 
and professional)
53.  – Remuneration (fees and 
other emoluments)
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IV. Projected information
54. Impact of opportunities on future income or profits 
(Quantitative/ Qualitative)
55. Impact of market risks on future results  
(Quantitative/ Qualitative)
56. Forecast of market share
57. Procedures to achieve the forecasted market share 
(Quantitative/ Qualitative)
58. Forecast of the next year’s profit/income
59. Procedure to achieve the profit projection  
(Quantitative/ Qualitative)
60. Forecast of major industry trends (e.g. competition) 
(Quantitative/ Qualitative)
B. RISK MANAGEMENT
I. Overall market risk exposure
61. Brief definition of market risk
62. Methodology (procedure) used to measure market price 
risk
63. Quantitative analysis of market risk
64. Explanations supported by graphs and tables
II. Interest rate risk exposure
65. Brief definition of interest rate risk
66. Methodology (procedure) used to measure interest rate 
risk
67. Analysis by reference to category of assets and 
liabilities
68. Analysis based on maturity structure
69. Explanations supported by graphs and tables 
III. Currency exposure of net assets
70. Brief definition of foreign exchange risk
71. Key procedures to manage foreign exchange risk
72. Major exchange rates used in the accounts
73. Quantitative analysis of currency risk
74. Explanations supported by graphs and tables
IV. Liquidity risk
75. Brief definition of liquidity risk
76. Key procedures to manage liquidity risk
77. Quantitative analysis of liquidity risk
78. Explanation supported by graphs and tables
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V. Credit risk 
79. Brief definition of credit risk
80. Key procedures to manage credit risk
81. Quantitative analysis of credit risk
82. Explanation supported by graphs and tables
VI. Operational risk
83. Brief definition of operational risk
84. Key procedures to manage operational risk
85. Quantitative analysis of operational risk
86. Explanation supported by graphs and tables
VII. Derivatives
87. Fair value of derivatives
88. Fair value analysis, classified by types of derivatives  
(e.g. options, swaps)
89. Maturity analysis of notional principal amount of 
derivatives
90. Maturity analysis, classified by types of derivatives
VIII. Hedging strategy
91. Discussion of the extent to which market risks are 
hedged (Qualitative)
92. Discussion of contracts undertaken in hedging 
(Qualitative)
93. Net gains (losses) on the contracts for hedging 
(Quantitative)
C. FINANCIAL INFORMATION
I. Summary of historical results
Comparison in years: 3 years and below
: 4 years and above
(a) Operating results
94. Profit before tax expense
95. Profit after tax expense and minority interests
96. Net interest income
97. Net income from Islamic banking 
98. Non-interest income
99. Staff costs and overhead costs
100. Advances for losses on loans, advances and financing
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(b) Key balance sheet data
101. Total assets
102. Loans, advances and financing
103. Total liabilities
104. Deposits from customers
105. Commitments and contingencies
(c) Share information
106. Basic earnings per share
107. Diluted earnings per share
108. Share price at local exchange and foreign exchange  
(if applicable)
109. Share price at year end
110. Share price trend (highest/ lowest)
111. Market capitalization at year end
112. Market capitalization trend
113. Size of shareholdings
114. Types of shareholders
(d) Financial ratio
115. Profitability ratios
116. Capital adequacy ratios
117. Dividend ratios
118. Liquidity / Gearing ratios
119. Efficiency ratio
II. Information on the financial statements
120. Breakdown of cash and short-term funds
121. Breakdown of deposits and placements with banks and 
other financial institutions
122. Breakdown of dealing securities
123. Breakdown of investment securities
124. Maturity structure of money market instruments
125. Disclosure of each type of fixed assets with respective 
accumulated depreciation
126. Loans, advances and financing- – By type (e.g. 
Overdrafts, Bill 
receivables, Staff loans)
127.  – By maturity
128.  – By type of customer
129.  – By interest/ profit rate 
sensitivity (e.g. Fixed 
rate, Variable rate)
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130.  – By sector (e.g. 
Agriculture, 
Manufacturing)
131. Movements in non-performing loans, advances and 
financing (Quantitative)
132. Movements in non-performing loans, advances and 
financing (Qualitative)
133. Movements in allowance for bad and doubtful 
financing (Quantitative)
134. Movements in allowance for bad and doubtful 
financing (Qualitative)
135.  – By sector (e.g. 
Agriculture, 
Manufacturing)
136. Statutory deposits with Bank Negara Malaysia
137. Breakdown of customer deposits- By types of deposits
138.  – By types of customers
139. Maturity structure of fixed deposits and negotiable 
instruments of deposits
140. Breakdown of deposits and placements of banks and 
other financial institutions
141. Breakdown of interest income
142. Breakdown of non interest income
143. Breakdown of interest expenses
144. Breakdown of staff costs and overheads
145. Breakdown of other operating incomes
146. Breakdown of other operating expenses
147. Impairment loss 
148. Capital adequacy 
149. Breakdown of gross risk-weighted assets in various 
categories of risk-weight
III. Segmental information
150. Geographical analysis of profit, by category of 
incomes
151. Geographical analysis of operating expenses
152. Geographic analysis of total assets
153. Line-of-business analysis of profit, by categories of 
income
154. Line-of-business analysis of operating expenses
155. Line-of-business analysis of total assets
156. Market share analysis (Quantitative)
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IV. Contingent liabilities and contingent assets
157. Nature of each class of contingent liability 
(Qualitative)
158. Nature of each class of contingent liability 
(Quantitative)
159. Nature of each class of contingent asset (Qualitative)
160. Nature of each class of contingent asset (Quantitative)
161. Declaration of non-existence of contingent liabilities 
and assets
V. Other information
162. Disclosure on the events after the balance sheet date 
but before the financial statements are authorized for 
issue
163. Disclosure on non-existence of events after the 
balance sheet date but before the financial statements 
are authorized for issue
164. Bank’s dividend policy (Quantitative)
165. Bank’s dividend policy (Qualitative)
166. Ratings by rating agencies
167. The nature and purpose of maintaining the reserve 
(Qualitative)
168. Allowance for losses on loans and financing 
(Quantitative)
169. Allowance for losses on loans and financing 
(Qualitative)
D. SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND VALUE ADDED 
INFORMATION
I. Employees
170. Share option schemes-Policy (Quantitative)
171. Share option schemes-Policy (Qualitative) 
172. Profit sharing schemes-Policy (Quantitative)
173. Profit sharing schemes-Policy(Qualitative)
174. Amount spent on training
175. Policy on training
176. Welfare information
177. Recruitment policy
II. Community
178. Charitable donations (Quantitative/ Qualitative)
179. Community programs (Quantitative/ Qualitative)
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III. Environment
180. Environmental protection policy
181. Effect on environment (Quantitative/ Qualitative)
E. OPERATIONS OF ISLAMIC BANKING
Information on the financial statements of Islamic 
banking operations
182. Breakdown of cash and short-term funds
183. Breakdown of deposits and placements with banks and 
other financial institutions
184. Breakdown of dealing securities
185. Breakdown of investment securities
186. Maturity structure of money market instruments
187. Disclosure of each type of fixed assets with respective 
accumulated depreciation
188. Loans, advances and financing – By type (e.g. 
Overdrafts, Bill 
receivables, Staff loans)
189.  – By maturity
190.  – By type of customer
191.  – By interest/ profit rate 
sensitivity (e.g. Fixed 
rate, Variable rate)
192.  – By contract
193.  – By sector (e.g. 
Agriculture, 
Manufacturing)
194. Movements in non-performing loans, advances and 
financing (Quantitative)
195. Movements in non-performing loans, advances and 
financing (Qualitative)
196. Movements in allowance for bad and doubtful 
financing (Quantitative)
197. Movements in allowance for bad and doubtful 
financing (Qualitative)
198.  – By sector (e.g. 
Agriculture, 
Manufacturing)
199. Breakdown profit equalization reserve
200. Breakdown of customer deposits – By type of deposits
201.  – By type of customers
202. Maturity structure of fixed deposits and negotiable 
instruments of deposits
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203. Breakdown of income from general investment 
deposits
204. Breakdown of income from specific investment 
deposits
205. Breakdown of income from other deposits
206. Breakdown of allowance for losses on financing
207. Breakdown of income attributable to depositors
208. Breakdown of other operating expenses
209. Income derived from investment of Islamic banking 
capital funds
210. Deposits and placements of banks and other financial 
institutions
211. Capital adequacy
212. Breakdown of gross risk-weighted assets in various 
categories of risk-weights
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APPENDIX 2
Section A: Disclosure Items in the Annual Reports
Please give your opinion on how important you think the following items in the 
annual report are by circling or crossing the appropriate number.   The objective 
is to obtain your opinion on the importance of these items in general, as some 
of the following items may not be appropriate to your company or organization 
specifically.
I. Disclosure on Strategic Information
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 General background of the company 
(Qualitative information, e.g. history of the company)
1 2 3 4 5
2 Corporate strategy
(a) Qualitative information 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information 1 2 3 4 5
3 List and composition of board and board sub-committees 
such as audit committee & remuneration committee
1 2 3 4 5
4 Roles and responsibilities of board and board sub-
committees
1 2 3 4 5
5 Information on remuneration committee 
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. description about the 
committee
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. remuneration scheme 1 2 3 4 5
6 Directors’ background information (e.g. age, educational 
qualification)
1 2 3 4 5
7 Information on internal control (e.g. key procedures) 1 2 3 4 5
8 Information on board and board sub-committee meetings 
(e.g. date, frequency, & attendance)
1 2 3 4 5
9 Description on Shari’ah committee (e.g. list, roles & 
responsibilities, education background, remuneration)
1 2 3 4 5
10 Projected or forecasted information 
(a) Qualitative information 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information 1 2 3 4 5
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II. Disclosure on Risk Management
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 Overall market risk exposure
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. procedure to manage market 
risk
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of market risk 
exposure
1 2 3 4 5
2 Interest rate risk exposure
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. procedure to manage interest 
rate risk
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of interest risk 
exposure
1 2 3 4 5
3 Currency risk exposure of net assets
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. procedure to manage 
currency risk
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of currency risk 
exposure
1 2 3 4 5
4 Liquidity risk
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. procedure to manage 
liquidity risk
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of liquidity risk 1 2 3 4 5
5 Credit risk
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. procedure to manage credit 
risk
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of credit risk 1 2 3 4 5
6 Operational risk
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. procedure to manage 
operational risk
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of operational ris 1 2 3 4 5
7 Derivatives (Quantitative information), e.g. maturity analysis 1 2 3 4 5
8 Hedging strategy 
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. contracts undertaken 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. gain/loss from hedging 1 2 3 4 5
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III. Disclosure on Comparative Financial Information  
(Applied to Both Conventional and Islamic Disclosure, 
wherever applicable)
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 Comparative operating results (e.g. profit before tax 
expense & net interest income)
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
2 Comparative expenses (e.g. staff costs & advances for 
losses on loans)
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
3 Key balance sheets data (e.g. total assets, loans, liabilities, 
deposit from customers & commitment and contingencies)
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
4 Shares information (e.g. basic earnings per share & share 
price)
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
5 Share holdings (e.g. size & types)
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
6 Financial performance ratio (e.g. profitability, dividend & 
efficiency ratios)
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
7 Capital structure ratio (e.g. capital adequacy ratio)
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
8 Gearing ratio/ Liquidity ratio
(a) 2 years and below 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 3 years and above 1 2 3 4 5
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IV. Disclosure in the Notes to the Accounts (Applied to Both 
Conventional and Islamic Disclosure, wherever applicable)
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 Breakdown of fixed and currents assets 
(e.g. cash and short-term funds, investment securities) 
1 2 3 4 5
2 Breakdown of other assets (e.g. loans, advances & financing) 
according to type, maturity, types of customers, interest rate 
sensitivity and sector
1 2 3 4 5
3 Breakdown of long-term and short-term liabilities (e.g. 
customer deposit & deposits and placements of other 
financial institutions)
1 2 3 4 5
4 Breakdown of the incomes from the profit and loss statement 
(e.g. interest income, non-interest income, other operating 
income)
1 2 3 4 5
5 Breakdown of the expenses from the profit and loss 
statement (e.g.  interest expense, staff costs and overheads & 
other operating expenses)
1 2 3 4 5
6 Maturity structure of money market instruments, fixed 
deposits and negotiable instruments of deposits
1 2 3 4 5
7 Breakdown of non-performing loans (e.g. sector) 1 2 3 4 5
8 Movement in non-performing loans, advances and financing 
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. explanation about 
movement
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. maturity analysis 1 2 3 4 5
9 Movements in allowance for bad and doubtful financing
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. explanation about 
movement
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. maturity analysis 1 2 3 4 5
10 Statutory deposits with Bank Negara Malaysia 1 2 3 4 5
11 Impairment loss
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. reasons for loss 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. numerical value of loss 1 2 3 4 5
12 Capital adequacy 1 2 3 4 5
13 Breakdown of gross risk-weighted assets in various 
categories of risk-weight
1 2 3 4 5
14 Breakdown of profit equalization reserve 1 2 3 4 5
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V. Disclosure on Segmental Information (Applied to Both 
Conventional and Islamic Disclosure, wherever applicable)
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 Segmental information based on geographical analysis
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. description of each 
segment
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of profit, 
revenue, assets
1 2 3 4 5
2 Segmental information based on line-of-business analysis 
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. description of each 
business line
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. analysis of profit, 
revenue, assets
1 2 3 4 5
VI. Disclosure on Market Share, Contingent Liabilities and Assets, 
and other Information (Applied to Both Conventional and 
Islamic Disclosure, wherever applicable)
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 Market share information
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. explanation on increase/ 
decrease in market shares
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. share price 1 2 3 4 5
2 Contingent liabilities and contingent assets
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. explanation on their 
occurrence 
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. numerical amount 1 2 3 4 5
3 Other information
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. events after balance sheet 
date, dividend policy
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. dividend policy, 
allowance for losses on loans and financing
1 2 3 4 5
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VII. Disclosure on Social and Environmental Information
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 Employees’ general information 
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. share-option policy 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. amount spent on 
training
1 2 3 4 5
2 Community  service
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. community program 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. charitable donation 1 2 3 4 5
3 Environmental disclosure
(a) Qualitative information, e.g. environmental protection 
policy
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Quantitative information, e.g. effect on environment 1 2 3 4 5
VIII. Additional Disclosure on Operations of Islamic Banking
Least important Most important
No. Description
1 Breakdown of the incomes from the profit and loss 
statement 
(e.g. income from general or specific investment deposits, 
from investment of Islamic banking capital funds)
1 2 3 4 5
2 Breakdown of the expenses from the profit and loss 
statement 
(e.g. allowances for losses on financing, other operating 
expenses)
1 2 3 4 5
3 Breakdown of income attributable to depositors 1 2 3 4 5
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Section B: Background of the Respondent
This section covers the background information of the respondent.  Please answer 
all the questions by ticking (√) in the appropriate boxes.
1. Gender of the respondent
Male Female
2. Educational background (You may tick more than one)
Bachelor degree Master
Ph.D Professional qualification 
(ACCA, CIMA, CFA, etc)
3. Employment category
Audit firm Non audit firm
4. Age range
Below 20 20 – 29 30 – 39
40 – 49 50 – 59 60 and above
5. Working experience with your current profession
Below 3 year 3 – 7 8 – 12
13 – 17 18 – 22 23 – 27
Above 27
